Putri Anggraini
For outside observers accustomed to Western political terminology, applying the traditional labels of "left" and "right" to the Israeli political landscape can often lead to substantial confusion. In political systems across North America and Europe, these classifications are primarily organized around disputes over taxation rates, social welfare spending, labor protections, immigration, and the overall scope of government intervention. While Israeli politicians certainly debate these matters, such domestic policy questions do not form the central pillars of the nation's political spectrum.
Instead, the Israeli ideological divide has long been established around fundamentally different concerns. The primary fault lines separating political factions involve policies toward the Palestinians, the administration of territory, national security strategies, the expansion of settlements, the core definition of Zionism, and the recurring structural tension between preserving a Jewish national identity and upholding democratic governance.
Because these existential and territorial questions predominate, traditional socioeconomic policies frequently cut across conventional voting blocs rather than establishing them. Consequently, an Israeli political figure who advocates for substantial state economic intervention can still be regarded as staunchly right-wing, while another who embraces progressive social values may remain firmly positioned inside the broader nationalist camp.
Historically, this political divide possessed a much stronger institutional and economic foundation than it exhibits at present. During the early decades of the state, the Israeli left was synonymous with Labor Zionism, which directed national development through foundational institutions such as the kibbutz movement, the Histadrut labor federation, and a broadly collectivist economic framework.
In contrast, the political right traced its ideological lineage to the Revisionist Zionist movement and eventually coalesced around the Likud party. This faction challenged the longstanding political dominance of Labor by emphasizing historic Jewish claims to the land, articulating a more robust concept of sovereign nationalism, and eventually adopting a platform more receptive to free-market capitalism. While echoes of these historical debates persist, they have ceased to be the governing axis of Israeli party politics.
The political terrain transformed significantly following the 1967 war and became even more polarized during the Oslo peace process in the 1990s. Throughout this era, Israeli political life increasingly rotated around the future of occupied territories and the Palestinian populations residing within them. The left advocated for territorial compromise, negotiated peace accords, and formal separation from the Palestinians, arguing that such measures were vital to ensure Israel remained both demographically Jewish and fundamentally democratic.
Conversely, the political right firmly resisted the creation of an independent Palestinian state, championed the construction of settlements, and insisted that territorial withdrawals would inevitably compromise national security rather than resolve the conflict. Over time, these opposing views on land and security completely eclipsed older economic distinctions.
The eruption of the second Intifada in the early 2000s dealt a severe blow to the standing of the left among the Jewish electorate. For wide segments of the public, the ensuing wave of violence was viewed as tangible evidence that the Oslo framework had collapsed and that land concessions would not reliably produce lasting stability or peace.
This skepticism was further cemented following the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The subsequent rise of Hamas to power in the territory, combined with successive rounds of military escalation, reinforced the right-wing narrative regarding the strategic risks of territorial disengagement. Rather than initiating a new political reality, the attacks of October 7, 2023, accelerated these established trends, anchoring security calculations and national identity even more deeply at the center of public discourse.
In contemporary Israeli politics, identifying as right-wing is fundamentally characterized by adopting an uncompromising stance regarding Palestinian national claims, territorial retention, and security management. This approach typically entails either the outright rejection of a sovereign Palestinian state or the acceptance of only severely circumscribed self-rule that falls far short of true independence.
Furthermore, within modern right-wing thought, Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank are no longer viewed as temporary negotiating chips to be bargained away in diplomatic exchanges. Instead, significant factions across the right view these settlements as crucial security assets, while others regard them as the fulfillment of an essential national and religious imperative within a Jewish nation-state framework.
Despite its nationalist focus, this right-wing alignment does not mirror standard Western conservative economic models. While Likud continues to present itself as supportive of market principles, the broader right-wing coalition readily accommodates government subsidies, public sector employment, housing assistance, and targeted welfare transfers to satisfy specific electoral constituencies and maintain coalition cohesion.
Likud remains the dominant political vehicle for this broader nationalist movement, bridging secular, traditional, and religious voters under a common security-focused banner. However, further to its ideological right sit parties such as Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit, which interpret territorial claims through an explicit theological lens. For these factions, settlement activity is a non-negotiable religious duty, making territorial compromise practically impossible to consider as a tactical policy option.
These hard-right factions have also displayed an increasing willingness to challenge foundational democratic institutions, including the Supreme Court, the attorney general, and portions of the security establishment, whenever those bodies are perceived as impeding the agenda of an elected right-wing parliamentary majority. The contentious debates over judicial reform that preceded October 7 stemmed directly from this tension, and while the war initially paused the dispute, institutional conflict has since re-emerged within public debate.
Meanwhile, the Zionist centre and the remnants of the traditional Zionist left—including figures such as Democrats party leader Yair Golan—occupy an increasingly constrained space. While they continue to defend the judiciary, the civil service, and civil liberties while remaining wary of permanent military control, the expansive peace-oriented rhetoric of earlier decades has largely diminished.
Political leaders from the centrist bloc, including former military chiefs Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, readily endorse extensive military operations while presenting themselves as institutional stewards who favor a more measured approach to annexation. Ultimately, the modern division between the Israeli centre and right rarely centers on whether to deploy military force, but rather on the long-term political objectives that force should achieve and whether future institutional restraints and political arrangements should be preserved.
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