Kordofan Emerges as Sudan War's Central Battleground as Drone Strikes Intensify

The Kordofan region has become one of the principal theaters of Sudan's civil war, with fighting intensifying since late 2025 as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) contest control of territory that straddles the boundary between the country's eastern and western power centers. The vast area, encompassing North, West and South Kordofan states, sits precisely where the two belligerents' zones of control converge, making it a strategic corridor between the army-held central region and the RSF-dominated Darfur in the west.

Now in its fourth year, the conflict has increasingly shifted toward aerial warfare, with drone strikes on towns across North Kordofan growing more frequent and deadly. Civilian infrastructure has been hit repeatedly throughout the region, underscoring the mounting toll on non-combatants. According to data compiled by the independent conflict monitor Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), one in every five recorded attacks in Sudan since the war began in April 2023 has occurred in Kordofan—a statistic that highlights the region's outsized importance in the broader conflict.

The strategic significance of Kordofan lies in its geography. The region forms a land bridge connecting the RSF's strongholds in Darfur to the army-controlled center, north and east. Following the fall of el-Fasher—the last major Darfur city held by the army and its allies—in October 2025, military attention shifted decisively toward Kordofan. Control of this corridor would open a route eastward toward Khartoum for the RSF, while the army's hold on the region protects its lines of communication and the capital itself.

On the ground, Sudan is broadly divided between the two sides. The SAF controls Khartoum, the capital, along with most of the north, east and center of the country. The RSF dominates the west, including almost all of Darfur and significant portions of Kordofan. Smaller armed groups, among them the RSF-allied Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), maintain pockets of territory in the south. The army holds the advantage in the north, the RSF in the west, while South Kordofan remains actively contested.

An Al Jazeera analysis of ACLED data identified 14,648 recorded attacks between the outbreak of the war on April 15, 2023, and September 19, 2026. The capital region of Khartoum has experienced the highest concentration, with 5,719 attacks—39 percent of the total and nearly three times the number recorded in North Darfur, the second-most affected state. North Darfur saw 1,999 attacks, representing 13.7 percent of the total, while Gezira state recorded 1,435 attacks, or 9.8 percent.

Collectively, North, South and West Kordofan recorded 2,876 attacks during the same period, accounting for approximately 19.7 percent of all recorded incidents. That places the region second only to Khartoum when its three states are considered together—a striking figure given that Kordofan comprises a far smaller share of Sudan's population than the capital region. The concentration of violence in Kordofan reflects its role as the principal junction where the two sides' territorial ambitions collide.

The SAF has been associated with the largest share of recorded attacks over the course of the war, accounting for just over half—52 percent—between April 2023 and September 2026. The RSF was linked to approximately 34.7 percent of attacks, while other actors were responsible for 13.3 percent. However, the balance has shifted significantly over time. The SAF recorded more attacks than the RSF during the first year and a half of the conflict, before the RSF overtook it in monthly attack counts from late 2024 through mid-2025.

Since August 2025, the two sides' monthly attack tallies have drawn closer together, with the SAF generally recording slightly more incidents even as the overall number of attacks has declined sharply. That decline may reflect shifting front lines, exhausted capabilities or seasonal factors, but it has not translated into reduced suffering for civilians in contested areas, where drone strikes have become an increasingly prominent and lethal feature of the war.

Within Kordofan, the three states recorded 2,717 attacks when considered separately: North Kordofan accounted for 1,205, or 44 percent; South Kordofan recorded 789; and West Kordofan saw 723. Adding Abyei—the disputed, oil-rich area on the Sudan-South Sudan border that was historically part of Kordofan—brings the total to 2,878. The variation across states illustrates how the fighting has clustered around specific strategic locations rather than spreading uniformly across the region.

North Kordofan's Sheikan locality alone accounted for 497 attacks, or 41 percent of the state's total. Sheikan is home to el-Obeid, the state capital and a commercial and administrative hub that links central Sudan with the west. Taking the city would open a route east toward Khartoum for the RSF, making it a critical objective. The intensity of fighting around el-Obeid reflects its importance not only as a military prize but also as a node in the region's economic life, with implications for trade, humanitarian access and civilian survival.

The human cost of the battle for el-Obeid was starkly illustrated on September 9, when a drone strike on a college in the city tore the roof off the building and killed a security guard, according to the college's dean, Abdel Aziz al-Sheikh, who spoke to Reuters. Omnia Aboul Gassim, a student who had sat her examinations at the college just one day before the attack, told Reuters that the entire faculty had been destroyed and that students felt their dreams and futures had been shattered. Such accounts have become tragically routine as aerial attacks reach deeper into civilian areas.

In South Kordofan, the main hotspot was Dilling locality, which recorded 242 attacks, or 31 percent of the state's total. Kadugli followed with 107 attacks, representing 14 percent, and Al Quoz recorded 94 attacks, or 12 percent. In West Kordofan, violence was distributed more evenly across localities, with Babnusa recording the most at 142 attacks, followed by En Nuhud with 119, Al Khiwai with 112 and Abu Zabad with 111. This dispersion suggests that while North Kordofan hosts the most concentrated fighting, West Kordofan faces a more diffuse but persistent pattern of violence.

The data also points to the broader trajectory of the war. After the fall of el-Fasher in October 2025, Kordofan became the primary arena where the SAF and RSF could realistically seek decisive gains. The region's position between the RSF-held west and the army-held center, north and east makes it the geopolitical hinge of the conflict. For the RSF, breaking through Kordofan would threaten Khartoum from a new direction. For the SAF, holding the region preserves the integrity of its central corridor and denies the RSF a path to the capital.

The intensification of drone strikes adds a further dimension of danger for civilians. Unlike ground combat, which is often concentrated along front lines, aerial attacks can reach deep into populated areas, striking schools, markets and residential neighborhoods. The strike on the el-Obeid college is one of many incidents that have damaged or destroyed civilian infrastructure across Kordofan and beyond, raising concerns about accountability and the protection of non-combatants.

As the war enters its fourth year, the battle for Kordofan shows no signs of abating. The region's three states, together with the disputed Abyei area, have become the fulcrum on which the wider conflict may turn. With nearly one in five recorded attacks in Sudan occurring in Kordofan, and with drone warfare escalating, the corridor linking Sudan's east and west remains both a strategic prize and a growing humanitarian catastrophe.