Yemen's New Offensive Hinges on Cohesion, Not Just Territory

Two days into "Dawn of Yemen," the counter-offensive launched by Yemen's internationally recognised government, forces have already reclaimed ground from the Houthis along the Red Sea coast near the Bab al-Mandeb strait. The operation, announced earlier this week, marks the most significant escalation in the country's civil war since a UN-brokered truce took hold in 2022. For four years, the conflict had been largely frozen, with front lines static and diplomacy stalled. Now, both sides appear determined to redraw the map.

The Saudi-led coalition supporting the government has committed 100 fighter jets to round-the-clock sorties aimed at securing the strategic waterway. In response, the Houthis have claimed attacks on Saudi territory, signalling that the conflict could once again spill across borders. According to Abdulla Banndar Al-Etaibi, writing in Al Jazeera's opinion section, the coming days will determine whether the offensive succeeds — and the outcome depends on more than battlefield gains alone.

The western coast is where the campaign will likely be decided, and the reasons extend well beyond Yemen's borders. With Iran disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea has become the Gulf's strategic lifeline. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline to Yanbu serves as its primary route around Hormuz, but crude shipped from Yanbu to Asian markets must still pass through Bab al-Mandeb. A Houthi grip on the strait's Yemeni shore effectively turns that bypass into a hostage, squeezing the Arabian Peninsula at both ends simultaneously — a scenario no Gulf capital can tolerate for long.

There is a counterintuitive dimension to the Houthis' position. Their greatest territorial gain of the year — the areas near Bab al-Mandeb — may also be their most exposed. The group's traditional strength lies in the mountains of northern Yemen, where rugged terrain, tribal networks and short supply lines favour defence. The Tihama coast is the opposite: a flat plain far from their highland base, with long, vulnerable supply routes and little natural cover against sustained airpower. If government forces can win decisively anywhere, it is here.

The immediate objective need not be the outright defeat of the Houthis, but rather pushing them back from the strait, retaking nearby islands and denying them the ability to convert geography into regional leverage. That would represent a meaningful strategic shift without requiring a march on Sanaa.

The second decisive front is Taiz, a city that functions as the hinge between the Houthi-held north, the government-held south and the western coastal theatre. If the Houthis continue to keep the Aden road severed, any broader offensive risks being split in two. Should government forces reopen that route, they would gain territorial continuity linking Aden, Taiz and the coast — a logistical and symbolic victory that could reshape the campaign.

The third front is Marib governorate, where fighting has escalated on the Raghwan axis, with potential spillover into al-Jawf. Despite sweeping rhetoric from Yemeni government officials, an early push on Sanaa remains unlikely. The more plausible strategy is cumulative pressure: by pressing the coast, Taiz and Marib simultaneously, the Houthis will struggle to concentrate manpower, missiles, drones and logistics on any single axis. The government does not need breakthroughs everywhere; it needs to keep the Houthis overstretched.

Support has rarely been the government's problem. Its recurring failure has been converting external backing into coherent Yemeni military power. Saudi Arabia remains the decisive player, and its incentives are now direct rather than abstract: Aramco facilities have come under fire, Saudi-linked shipping has been declared a target, and the main route circumventing the Strait of Hormuz is exposed. The deployment of 100 aircraft signals that Riyadh is willing to invest heavily in the operation.

Yet airpower, however formidable, can destroy positions, cut supply lines and break concentrations of force — but it cannot hold territory. That requires Yemeni forces to fight under a unified chain of command, support functioning local administration and maintain political agreement that prevents infighting between factions. Here, the anti-Houthi camp is arguably weaker than at any point in the war.

The Southern Transitional Council, which launched its own offensive across the south in December 2025, was dissolved in January after a Saudi-backed counteroffensive, and its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, left the country. The southern units that fought under its banner remain armed and capable, but they now operate without a political roof, and their loyalty to the Yemeni government is conditional at best. Alongside them, Tareq Saleh's National Resistance on the coast, the Southern Giants Brigades, and units aligned with the Islah Party in Taiz and Marib each answer to different leaderships, regional priorities and external patrons. The Houthis, by contrast, possess a centralised political and military command — an asymmetry that represents the offensive's greatest vulnerability.

If the campaign is fought through fragmented chains of command, gains will be temporary. Rival forces will compete over captured territory, revenues and authority, allowing the Houthis to regroup and counterattack. Recognising this reality, the Yemeni government has begun preparing to distribute salary payments and undertake reconstruction in recovered areas. That is the right instinct: a town taken by airstrikes but left unpaid and ungoverned will not stay taken. This effort needs to be sustained.

The offensive should not be judged by whether it captures Sanaa. That benchmark is maximalist and almost guarantees a verdict of failure. The better question is whether it makes the conflict ripe for resolution. In the language of conflict studies, parties negotiate seriously when they perceive a mutually hurting impasse. Since 2022, the deadlock has hurt the Yemeni people, the government, Saudi Arabia and global shipping — but not the Houthis. Whether "Dawn of Yemen" can change that calculus may prove more important than any single territorial gain.